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Police, legal professionals, and lay persons generally consider confessions
to be convincing evidence of guilt.1 Many confessions are truthful, but
there is ample evidence that at least some confessions are false. The
actual rate of false confessions is not known. However, there is a growing
number of United States studies examining proven and probable cases of
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario.
1. See Smith v. The Queen, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368, 389. Psychological research
confirms the compelling nature of confession evidence. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine
Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the
Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (1997). It also
suggests that knowledge that the confession was coerced does not alter the damning
nature of such evidence. See Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and
the Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
27, 27 (1997).
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wrongful convictions, and the more recent studies have attempted to
identify and quantify the various factors that contributed to the conviction.
These studies reveal that false confessions played an important role in
the wrongful conviction in approximately fourteen to twenty-five percent of
the cases examined.2 Unfortunately, there have been no similar attempts
in either Canada or the United Kingdom to systematically identify and
quantify the factors that have contributed to the known wrongful
convictions in these jurisdictions.
Surprisingly, even when a confession is false, many accused will either
plead guilty, or contest the case and be convicted at trial.3 This situation
is improving because false confessions are increasingly being revealed
prior to trial as a result of early DNA testing.4 However, even when
there is early exposure of a false confession, the individual involved
often still endures significant liberty and other deprivations as a result of
making the false confession.5 Innocent individuals falsely confess to
committing crimes for many reasons.6 An expanding body of research7
indicates that two of the main factors are the personal characteristics of
the individual, and the interrogation methods that the police use on the
individual, including the actual conditions of interrogation and detention.8
In R. v. Oickle, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly stated that the
Canadian confessions rule “should recognize which interrogation techniques
commonly produce false confessions so as to avoid miscarriages of
justice.”9 As a result, the Court reformulated the traditional confessions
rule in an attempt to better protect against false confessions. An obvious
question is whether the Court succeeded in attaining this goal. An

2. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 901–07 (2004).
3. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 477–85 (1998) [hereinafter Leo &
Ofshe, Consequences]; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth About False
Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 293, 306–10 (2001); Drizin
& Leo, supra note 2, at 921–23, 961–62.
4. Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 900, 950–53.
5. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 3, at 472; Drizin & Leo, supra note 2,
at 900, 949–55.
6. For a review of the literature on the psychological basis for false confessions,
see GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK 193–215 (2003).
7. I refer to this research throughout this Article. For a recent excellent summary
of much of the psychological research and its implications, see generally Saul M. Kassin
& Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and
Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PUB. INT. 33 (2004).
8. Id. at 51, 53. A further factor is the nature of the offense. See GUDJONSSON,
supra note 6, at 146–48.
9. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 25.
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examination of the reformulated rule indicates that, viewed in the abstract
and measured against the current state of knowledge on false confessions,
the modern rule does offer considerable protection to innocent persons,
but it also has some significant shortcomings. Additional reforms are
necessary to further reduce the risk of false confessions. These reforms
should include greater judicial recognition of the individual risk factors
associated with false confessions, mandatory videotaping of interrogation,
and direct regulation of particular interrogation tactics. The Court should
also consider incorporating a post-confession reliability analysis into the
modern confessions rule.
I. THE CONFESSIONS RULE
The Canadian confessions rule excludes any statement that an accused
makes to a person in authority, unless the Crown proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused made the statement voluntarily.
Traditionally, courts would only find that a statement was involuntary if
it had been obtained by “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage” or, in
modern terms, by inducements in the form of threats or promises.10 The
rule was eventually expanded to exclude statements that were not the
product of an “operating mind,” because accused persons did not know
what they were saying, or that the statement could be used to their
detriment,11 as well as statements obtained through an interrogation
conducted in an oppressive manner.12 There was also some suggestion
in the case law, which never received full Supreme Court approval, that
a statement could be excluded if the police had engaged in a form of
trickery that shocked the conscience of Canadians.13 However, the
courts tended to treat each of these actual or potential branches of the
rule as independent grounds of exclusion: a violation of a specific
branch of the rule usually had to be shown to exclude an accused
person’s statement.14
As reformulated in Oickle, the trial judge may rule a statement
involuntary if it was obtained by an inducement, the lack of an operating
10. Prosko v. The King, [1922] 63 S.C.R. 226, 229–30 (adopting Ibrahim v. The
King, [1914] A.C. 599, 609 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.)).
11. Ward v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 30, 40; Horvath v. The Queen, [1979] 2
S.C.R. 376, 392; R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, 939.
12. Hobbins v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 553, 556–57.
13. Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, 697 (Lamer, J., concurring).
14. See Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 22–23, 25, 44.
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mind, oppression, or a combination of any these circumstances.15 The
modern inquiry into voluntariness thus requires an assessment of the
totality of the circumstances—a trial judge must consider all aspects of
the rule to determine whether the various aspects, either alone or in
combination, raise a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the
statement.16 A contextual approach is explicitly mandated, one which
generally eschews hard and fast rules.17 If there is a reasonable doubt
that a statement is voluntary, it must be excluded.18 In addition to this
contextual analysis, a statement will be excluded as involuntary if the
police obtained the statement through trickery that shocks the conscience
of Canadians.19 Police trickery is therefore recognized as a distinct
branch of the voluntariness inquiry.20
II. FALSE CONFESSIONS RESEARCH AND THE REFORMULATED RULE
The likelihood of an innocent individual falsely confessing to a crime
varies depending on a host of considerations. The two main considerations
are the personal characteristics of the individual and the interrogation
methods that the police use on the individual, including the actual
conditions of interrogation and detention.21 An examination of the modern
rule as set out in Oickle, in light of the current state of psychological and
legal knowledge on the causes of false confessions, indicates that the
modern rule offers considerable protection to innocent persons, but it
also has some significant shortcomings.
A. Problematic Suspects
False confession researchers have identified certain categories of
individuals who are more likely than others to make false confessions.
These categories include individuals with intellectual disabilities,22
15. Id. at 42–43. The Court recently reaffirmed the approach set out in Oickle.
See R. v. Spencer, 2007 S.C.C. 11, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 358–59 (2007).
16. See Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 31.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 25.
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id. at 41.
21. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51–53 (personal characteristics),
53–55 (situational factors).
22. WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 201–03 (2001) [hereinafter WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING
PROTECTIONS]; Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 970–73; Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington’s
Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471,
1491–94 (1995); Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
979, 989–90, 995–1002 (2003) [hereinafter White, Capital Cases]; Welsh S. White,
Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV.
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individuals with mental illnesses,23 young persons,24 and individuals with
compliant or suggestible personalities.25 Not every individual who falls
within one of these categories is equally prone to making a false confession;
however, in cases involving such individuals there should be careful
scrutiny of their personal characteristics in order to identify and evaluate
the degree of vulnerability that is present.26
Individuals with intellectual disabilities are considered problematic
suspects because they are often particularly susceptible to pressure and
coercion, and are highly suggestible and eager to please authority
figures.27 They may also fail to appreciate the long-term consequences
of their statements or actions. These two attributes, when coupled with
police interrogation techniques that make it clear to the individual that
the interrogator wants a statement, may induce an innocent, intellectually
disabled individual to falsely confess to a crime. Indeed, individuals
with intellectual disabilities may have difficulty coping with “even the
average level of stress built into an interrogation . . . .”28 Young persons
are considered problematic suspects for many of the same reasons. They
do not yet have fully developed intellectual capacities, they often wish to
please authority figures, and they may not fully appreciate the long-term
consequences of making a false confession.29 Moreover, the younger the
1211, 1232 (2001) [hereinafter White, Miranda’s Failure]; Welsh S. White, What is an
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2044–46 (1998) [hereinafter
White, Involuntary Now].
23. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY 284–86 (1992); Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 973–74; Kassin &
Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53. Further research is required to ascertain the risk factors
associated with specific mental disorders. For a summary of how various mental
disorders may increase an individual’s risk of making a false confession, see Deborah
Davis & William T. O’Donohue, The Road to Perdition: Extreme Influence Tactics in
the Interrogation Room, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: RESOURCE FOR
MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 897, 963–67 (William T. O’Donahue &
Eric R. Levensky eds., 2004).
24. GUDJONSSON, supra note 6, at 141–43; Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 944–45,
963, 968–69; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1232.
25. GUDJONSSON, supra note 23, at 142–62; Welsh S. White, False Confessions
and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 105, 120 (1997).
26. See White, supra note 25, at 121.
27. GUDJONSSON, supra note 23, at 284–86; Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without
Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 495, 511–14 (2002); White, supra note 25, at 118–23.
28. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 202.
29. Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Front: A Guide to
How Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions
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children, the greater the risk that they will succumb to the pressures of
interrogation and make a false confession.30
Individuals with compliant personalities exhibit two key personality
traits. First, they wish to please and they need to protect their self-esteem
when interacting with other people. Second, they try to avoid conflict and
confrontation with other people, especially authority figures.31 Compliant
individuals, therefore, will generally wish to agree with the interrogator
even if it means agreeing to a version of facts that differs from their own
recollection of the events, particularly if the interrogator emphasizes
certainty in the individual’s guilt.32
Suggestible individuals also appear to be more prone to making false
confessions.33 Interrogative suggestibility differs from compliance because
it requires individuals to personally accept the information the interrogator
communicates to them, while compliance merely requires agreement.34
Various factors affect suggestibility, including low intelligence, age,
poor memory, low self-esteem, lack of assertiveness, and anxiety.35
Trusting individuals also tend to be more suggestible than suspicious
individuals, as do sleep-deprived individuals and individuals who are
withdrawing from alcohol or drugs.36
The modern confessions rule addresses the personal characteristics of
the individual being interrogated in two respects. First, the operating
mind doctrine expressly requires that the individuals know what they are
saying and know that the statement can be used to their detriment in

from Juvenile Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 130,
157 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of
Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra, at
107, 109, 112–16.
30. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 52–53; Allison D. Redlich & Gail
S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and
Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 151–52 (2003).
31. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51.
32. White, supra note 25, at 124–25. Psychologists use a compliance scale to
measure an individual’s fear of authority and his or her eagerness to please. There is a
correlation between higher scale scores and the likelihood of making a false confession,
but further research is necessary to establish the predictive validity of the scale. See
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51.
33. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51–52. Suggestibility refers to the
likelihood of the individual modifying his or her behavior as a result of accepting the
messages that the police communicate to him or her during the course of the
interrogation. Id.
34. GUDJONSSON, supra note 23, at 137.
35. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Application of Interrogative Suggestibility to Police
Interviewing, in HUMAN SUGGESTIBILITY: ADVANCES IN THEORY, RESEARCH AND
APPLICATION 279, 282–83 (John F. Schumaker ed., 1991); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra
note 7, at 52.
36. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 29, 38–39.
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court.37 However, this is an extremely low test of cognitive capacity.
The doctrine will not generally operate on its own to exclude many
confessions, even in cases involving vulnerable individuals.38 More
important is the modern rule’s recognition that individual vulnerabilities
that fall short of establishing a lack of an operating mind are still relevant
factors in the overall assessment of voluntariness. As the Supreme Court
stated in Oickle, judges must “be sensitive to the particularities of the
individual suspect.”39 The modern rule therefore allows judges to consider
all personal characteristics of the individual, such as intellectual disability
and age, as well as personality traits like compliance and suggestibility,
all of which may not establish that the individual lacked an operating
mind when making the statement. It equally allows judges to consider
incident-specific concerns including intoxication, alcohol or drug
withdrawal, and sleep deprivation, which may intensify the vulnerability
of an already vulnerable suspect or create vulnerabilities in an otherwise
non-vulnerable suspect.40 This represents a significant advance over the
previous law and its compartmentalized approach to the assessment of
voluntariness.
However, there is cause for concern in this area. Most notably, the
Court in Oickle does not discuss in any detail the types of personal
characteristics and incident-specific concerns that lead to an enhanced
risk of false confessions. The Court’s only direct reference to this issue,
drawing on the work of Professor White, is as follows:
False confessions are particularly likely when the police interrogate particular
types of suspects, including suspects who are especially vulnerable as a result of
their background, special characteristics, or situation, suspects who have
compliant personalities, and, in rare instances, suspects whose personalities
make them prone to accept and believe police suggestions made during the
course of the interrogation.41

The Court therefore fails to provide any real guidance to judges and
counsel on this important issue.
In addition, in its general discussion of the relationship between false
confessions and police interrogation techniques, the Court makes some
37. Id. at 40.
38. See Christopher Sherrin, False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law,
30 QUEEN’S L.J. 601, 639–56 (2005).
39. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 29.
40. See generally GUDJONSSON, supra note 6, at 389–90, 415–33 (discussing the
effect of alcohol and drugs on suspect vulnerability).
41. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 29 (quoting White, supra note 25, at 120).
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comments that arguably undermine its recognition that the particular
characteristics of the individual must always be kept in mind. Drawing
on the work of Professors Ofshe and Leo, the Court accepts that “[f]alse
confessions are rarely the product of proper police techniques,”42 but
rather “almost always involve ‘shoddy police practice and/or police
criminality.’”43 It also accepts that “in most cases, ‘eliciting a false
confession takes strong incentives, intense pressure and prolonged
questioning.’”44 The Court’s ready acceptance of these comments is
problematic because it ignores the work of other leading false confession
researchers who have demonstrated the enhanced risk that exists for
vulnerable individuals even when law enforcement uses proper interrogation
techniques, as well as the thin line between legitimate and illegitimate
interrogation techniques. As Professors Kassin and Gudjonsson state,
“[A]n individual may be so dispositionally naive, compliant, suggestible,
delusional, anxious, or otherwise impaired that little interrogative
pressure is required to produce a false confession.”45 Moreover, judges
and counsel may be led astray by such comments and may fail to
properly consider individual vulnerabilities in a particular case, because
the police rely on interrogation strategies and techniques that either do
not in the abstract appear particularly problematic, or do not rise to the
level described by the Court. Indeed, a recent review of the confessions
case law suggests this is occurring.46 This is a significant shortcoming
given that researchers have indicated that individual vulnerabilities are
an important cause of false confessions.47
B. Problematic Interrogation Strategies and Techniques
The police have available to them a wide variety of legitimate and
illegitimate interrogation strategies and techniques including using

42. Id. at 30.
43. Id. (quoting Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 3, at 492.)
44. Id. (quoting Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of
Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16
STUD. IN L., POL. & SOC’Y 189, 193 (1997)).
45. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 56. The Court also ignores Ofshe and
Leo’s own acknowledgement of this reality. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 192–93.
46. Sherrin, supra note 38. Based on a review of the case law Sherrin concludes
that “the confessions rule has not generally been interpreted or applied in a way that
adequately takes [individual] vulnerabilities into account.” Id. at 656.
47. See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Disputed Confessions and Miscarriages of
Justice in Britain: Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Evidence in the Court of
Appeal, 31 MANITOBA L.J. 489 (2006). Gudjonsson examined thirty of the leading false
confessions cases in Britain and found that in approximately two-thirds of the cases the
primary cause of the false confession was the individual’s psychological vulnerability,
not police misconduct. Id. at 492.

484

IVES.DOC

[VOL. 44: 477, 2007]

11/9/2007 10:59:38 AM

Preventing False Confessions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

threats and promises, flattering or sympathizing with the individual,
sidestepping the individual’s denials and objections, minimizing the
moral seriousness of the individual’s offense, exaggerating the strength
of the evidence against the individual, and even relying on fabricated
evidence. In most cases, the police will utilize more than one technique
during an interrogation, which can intensify the effect of an individual
technique.48 Through their examination of interrogation strategies and
techniques in individual cases, as well as psychological research, false
confession researchers have identified several strategies and techniques
that appear to have a greater likelihood of inducing individuals to falsely
confess. The strategies and techniques that have raised the most concern
among researchers are third degree interrogation tactics, promises of
leniency, threats of adverse consequences for third parties, police
deception about the strength of the evidence in the case, and lengthy
interrogations.49
It has long been recognized and accepted that third degree interrogation
tactics, including both actual and threatened violence, have the potential
to induce innocent individuals to falsely confess.50 The available
research substantiates this view because a number of the proven and
probable cases of false confessions involve the use of direct physical
violence against the individual.51 Other types of explicit or implicit
threats, such as threats of further charges or enhanced punishment, can
also induce false confessions.52 Even a threat directed at a third party
may induce an innocent individual to falsely confess if the individual has
sufficient ties to the threatened third party—for example, a close friendship
48.
49.

White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1233.
See generally Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53–55, 60; WHITE,
MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 204, 212; White, supra note 25, at
143–53.
50. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 205–06. For a description of the actual range
of third degree techniques used to obtain confessions, see Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at
908–09.
51. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 223
(5th ed. 2002); Wayne T. Westling, Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let’s
Try Video Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537, 543 (2001).
52. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 192; Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 979, 1077–78, 1084–88 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess];
White, Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2052. These techniques are often referred to
as maximization strategies. See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations
and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 234–35 (1991).
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or a family relationship—and the threat involves serious adverse
consequences for that third party.53 In such circumstances, the individual
may decide that shielding the other individual from harm must take
precedence over trying to maintain innocence.
Promises of leniency may also lead to a false confession, particularly
where the promised leniency is significant.54 The promise need not be
express. Research indicates that implied promises of leniency, such as
when the interrogator minimizes the individual’s legal culpability by
suggesting that the individual was provoked or acted in self-defense or
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, are almost as problematic as
express promises of leniency because they can cause the individual to
believe that a confession to such conduct will yield a more lenient
sentence or no charges.55 However, the police are unlikely to induce an
innocent individual, at least one who is not vulnerable in some way, to
make a false confession if they only hold out some moderate or minimal
benefit for the individual.56 As Ofshe and Leo state, “The psychological
benefits of reducing guilt, doing the right thing, showing empathy for the
victim’s family, straightening things out with God, and appearing honorable
in the eyes of the investigator or the community are not likely to elicit a
decision to confess from an innocent person . . . .”57 The following types
of statements are, therefore, usually not problematic in themselves:
“You’ll feel better after confessing”; “Confession is good for the soul”;
or “Your family and friends will think better of you if you confess.”58
False confession researchers have also expressed considerable concern
over the use of deceptive practices and, in particular, police deception

53. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 210–11; Ofshe &
Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1080–82; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at
229–30; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1241–42.
54. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 205–06; White,
Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2050–52; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at
1234–36.
55. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 205; Saul M.
Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in INVESTIGATIVE
INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH AND REGULATION 207, 217 (Tom Williamson ed.,
2006); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 55; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 204–
05; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1088–89; White, Miranda’s
Failure, supra note 22, at 1235–36. See also Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating
True and False Confessions within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI.
481, 484–86 (2005). These techniques are often referred to as minimization strategies.
See Kassin & McNall, supra note 52, at 234–35.
56. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 205; White,
Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1234–35.
57. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1060. One reason for this
is that the officer is asking the suspect to do the very thing that is prohibited by the
cultural standards appealed to by the officer, namely, tell a lie.
58. White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1236.
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about the strength of the evidence.59 This type of deception is designed
to convince the individual that the police have conclusive evidence of
the individual’s guilt, which research indicates increases the likelihood
that an individual will confess.60 Moreover, research suggests that
confronting innocent individuals with false evidence not only increases
the risk of a false confession, it also increases the risk that the individuals
will internalize a false belief in their guilt.61 Police deception about the
strength of the case can take many forms. The police may assert that the
“case is cracked” or that the evidence “speaks for itself” as to the
individual’s guilt. They may exaggerate the strength of specific pieces
of evidence, make up witnesses who will testify against the individual,
assert that the individual has failed a polygraph test, or present fake
forensic evidence. The likelihood that these forms of deception will cause
an individual to falsely confess depends on the personal characteristics
of the individual and the specific tactic that the police employ.
Most false confession researchers believe that the first form of
deception—generally exaggerating the strength of the evidence or the
interrogator’s belief in the individual’s guilt—is unlikely to lead to false
confessions in the vast majority of cases.62 They also believe that most
innocent individuals who are told there are witnesses who can testify as
to their involvement in the crime will simply conclude the witness made
an honest error or is lying,63 with the possible exception of cases where
the police falsely inform the individual that someone has confessed and
implicated the individual in the crime.64 In contrast, most researchers
have concluded that the other forms of deception—using fake forensic
evidence that purportedly establishes the individual’s guilt and, perhaps,
59. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211–14; Kassin,
supra note 55, at 216–17; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 54–55; White,
Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1243.
60. See Stephen Moston et al., The Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect
Behaviour During Questioning, 32 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 23, 34 (1992).
61. Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 221 (2005).
62. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211; White,
Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1243.
63. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211; Ofshe &
Leo, supra note 44, at 202; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1017.
But see White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1245 (noting that the force of the
false eyewitness evidence could nonetheless convince an individual it was futile to
continue to resist).
64. Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 976, 981; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess,
supra note 52, at 1018.

487

IVES.DOC

11/9/2007 10:59:38 AM

falsifying polygraph results—may induce an innocent individual to
falsely confess.65 In particular, this type of deception may be sufficient
to convince suggestible or compliant innocent individuals that they are
in fact guilty, or other less suggestible individuals that it is futile to
continue to assert innocence because they will be convicted anyway.66
The modern confessions rule addresses the risk created by specific
police interrogation strategies and techniques in a variety of ways. First,
the inducements aspect of the rule excludes any statement obtained by
improper police inducements. More specifically, any statement that is
obtained through actual or threatened physical violence, the so-called
third degree interrogation techniques, will usually be excluded as
involuntary.67 In addition, an explicit offer by the police to secure lenient
treatment in return for a statement constitutes a very strong inducement
to confess and will, therefore, generally lead to a finding of involuntariness.68
Less explicit offers indicating the possibility of a reduced charge or
sentence, at least when coupled with protracted questioning, will also
usually raise a reasonable doubt about a statement’s voluntariness.
However, milder inducements, such as promises of psychiatric assistance
or other forms of counseling are less likely to lead in themselves to a
conclusion of involuntariness.69 Moreover, moral or spiritual inducements
will rarely result in the exclusion of a statement.70 These general principles
extend to implicit as well as explicit threats or promises. For example,
police use of the phrase “it would be better . . .” may result in exclusion
if, viewed in context, it amounts to an implicit threat or promise.71
Finally, implicit or explicit threats or promises directed against a third
party will raise a reasonable doubt about voluntariness if there is a
sufficiently close relationship between the individual and the third
party.72 Ultimately, the key considerations are the existence of a quid

65. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211–13; Ofshe &
Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1023, 1031–32, 1036–41; Ofshe & Leo,
supra note 44, at 189, 202–03; White, Capital Cases, supra note 22, at 1015–19; White,
Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2053–55; White, supra note 25, at 128. This may
include inventing fake technologies or procedures. See Ofshe & Leo, Decision to
Confess, supra note 52, at 1032–35. For psychological research supporting this view,
see Robert Horselenberg et al., Individual Differences and False Confessions: A
Conceptual Replication of Kassin and Kiechel (1996), 9 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1 (2003);
Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions:
Compliance, Internalization and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996).
66. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211.
67. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 32, 34.
68. Id. at 32.
69. Id. at 33.
70. Id. at 36–37.
71. Id. at 36, 48–49.
72. Id. at 33–34.
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pro quo offer, whether phrased as a threat or a promise,73 and a showing
that the offer was strong enough, either individually or in combination
with other factors, to overcome the individual’s will to remain silent.74
Second, the oppression doctrine recognizes that police use of false
evidence may contribute to an atmosphere of oppression that renders a
confession involuntary.75 However, even under the modern rule, conveying
false forensic or eyewitness evidence to the individual will not by itself
usually render a statement involuntary. Similarly, police exaggeration of
the reliability of evidence, including polygraph evidence, will rarely by
itself raise issues as to voluntariness. As the Court stated in Oickle,
“While the police admittedly exaggerated the reliability of such devices,
the tactic of inflating the reliability of incriminating evidence is a common,
and generally unobjectionable one.”76 The independent police trickery
branch of the modern rule also recognizes that a statement may be
excluded as involuntary if the police engage in conduct that shocks the
conscience of Canadians. This is a very difficult standard to satisfy, which
is apparent in the examples cited by the Court—where the interrogator
pretends to be a chaplain, lawyer, or doctor.77 The use of exaggerated or
fabricated evidence will rarely rise to a level that is sufficient to justify
exclusion under this branch of the confessions rule.78 Finally, the modern
rule requires judges to consider the impact of specific interrogation
strategies and techniques in light of the overall circumstances of the case.
The strength or weakness of the inducement, therefore, is not ultimately
determinative. As the Court stated in Oickle,
[A] relatively minor inducement . . . may amount to an impermissible inducement if
the suspect is deprived of sleep, heat, and clothes for several hours in the middle of
the night. . . . On the other hand, where the suspect is treated properly, it will take a
stronger inducement to render the confession involuntary.79

73. Id. at 37–38.
74. Id. at 37; see also R. v. Spencer, 2007 S.C.C. 11, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 359–60
(2007).
75. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 54, 58.
76. Id. at 14.
77. One can question why such statements are caught by the confessions rule
because the accused would likely not believe that he or she was speaking to a person in
authority. The examples nonetheless emphasize the test’s strictness. For an analysis of
the limited impact of the police trickery branch of the confessions rule, see generally
Michael C. Plaxton, Who Needs Section 23(4)? Or: Common Law Sleight-of-Hand, 10
CRIM. REP. (6th) 236 (2003).
78. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 54, 58.
79. Id. at 44 (citation omitted).
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The Court’s formulation of the threats and promises component of the
modern confessions rule therefore generally precludes police reliance on
three of the interrogation strategies and techniques that false confession
researchers have identified as the most likely to induce an innocent
individual to falsely confess. These are third degree tactics,80 promises of
leniency in conjunction with an intense and lengthy interrogation,81 and
threats against a third party where there is a sufficiently close relationship
between the party and the individual.82 In contrast, in accordance with
the existing research, more moderate and minimal threats and promises,
particularly moral and spiritual inducements, will rarely themselves
justify a finding of involuntariness, but must instead be assessed in light
of all of the circumstances.83
In addition, in its reformulation of the rule the Court expressly
acknowledged that the use of fabricated evidence can be a dangerous
ploy.84 At the same time, it held that not all types of deception give rise
to the same risk of inducing false confessions.85 What the Court did not
do, and arguably should have done, is provide more guidance to judges
and counsel by identifying more directly the types of deceptive behavior
that are most likely to induce an individual to falsely confess. The Court
should also have given more serious consideration to police deception
about the existence of forensic evidence implicating the individual, and
whether it is truly necessary to allow the police to engage in this form of
deception,86 particularly because recent psychological research suggests
that this technique may be more effective in inducing confessions from
innocent individuals than from guilty individuals.87 That is, although a
key factor in an individual’s decision to confess is the perceived strength
of the evidence against that individual,88 the likelihood of a confession
appears to diminish if the individual recognizes that the evidence is
80. Id. at 32, 33, 34.
81. Id. at 32.
82. Id. at 33–34.
83. Id. at 33, 35–38.
84. Id. at 39.
85. Id. at 54.
86. In England, police deceit about the existence of forensic or eyewitness
evidence is not allowed. See R v. Mason, (1987) 3 All E.R. 481, 484–85. In contrast,
the United States Supreme Court does not appear to be very concerned over the use of
this tactic. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). For a discussion of the merits
of allowing police deception, see generally Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False
Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation
Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 (2006), and Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil:
Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996).
87. See Moston et al., supra note 60, at 29–40; Mark R. Kebbell et al., Mocksuspects’ Decisions to Confess: The Accuracy of Eyewitness Evidence is Crucial, 20
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 477, 483–84 (2006).
88. See Moston et al., supra note 60, at 34.
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inaccurate.89 At the very least the Court should indicate that the use of
false forensic evidence is a particularly dangerous interrogation technique if
it is used in combination with an express or implied promise of leniency.
C. Problematic Conditions of Interrogation and Detention
Police interrogations are inherently coercive. The individual being
interrogated is faced with an unfamiliar and uncomfortable environment,
isolated from the outside world and other people, and subject to the
control of those in authority. The basic conditions of interrogation and
detention, in other words, create stress and exert pressure on individuals
to speak with the police.90 Altering these conditions to increase the
stress and pressure on the individual can increase the risk of a false
confession.
In particular, false confession researchers have assembled a considerable
body of evidence that shows that the risk of a false confession increases
with the length of the interrogation.91 Lengthy interrogations give rise to
greater fatigue, uncertainty, confusion, fear, anxiety, stress, and despair
on the part of the individual, all of which can increase the individual’s
desire to bring the interrogation process to a conclusion no matter the
cost.92 In other words, the more prolonged the interrogation, the greater
the likelihood that the individual will become fixated on the immediate
benefit of confessing (removal from the interrogation process) to the
neglect of the potential long-term consequences of falsely confessing
(conviction and imprisonment).93 As Professor White states, “No matter
how benign the process, virtually continuous questioning by the police
will at some point be unfair because it exerts too much pressure on the

89. See Kebbell et al., supra note 87, at 483–84.
90. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53–54. As already noted, an
individual’s personal characteristics and situation can either diminish or intensify the
stress and pressure of the interrogation. See WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS,
supra note 22, at 211; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 56.
91. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53–54; White, Involuntary Now, supra
note 22, at 2042, 2046–49; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1232. The effect
of a lengthy interrogation may be moderated by factors such as the suspect’s age and the
time of day that the interrogation occurs. See Kassin, supra note 61, at 221.
92. Kassin, supra note 55, at 216; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 52–53,
60; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1061.
93. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53.
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suspect.”94 In addition, lengthier interrogations allow the police to
utilize a greater variety of techniques in their bid to obtain a confession.
However, the research does not indicate the precise point at which one
can say that the length of the interrogation has itself created a perceptively
higher risk of false confession. This is in part because it is not just the
length of the interrogation that increases the potential for a false confession;
it is also the individual’s perception about how long the interrogation
may last. Individuals who want to bring an end to what is perceived to
be a mentally and physically debilitating process may decide to falsely
confess even if they feel able to endure the questioning for another hour
or two if they also believe that the police will be allowed to continue the
interrogation past that point.95 All the research shows at this point is that
most of the proven and probable cases of false confessions have
involved interrogations of six to twenty-four hours, with an average
length of just over sixteen hours,96 and many of them have also involved
deception as to the strength of the evidence and promises of lenient
treatment in exchange for a confession.97
The modern confessions rule addresses the risk created by the actual
conditions of interrogation and detention in two respects. First, the
oppressions doctrine aspect of the rule expressly acknowledges that
oppressive circumstances can contribute to a false confession and that
oppression may, therefore, render a confession involuntary.98 In the
Court’s words:
If the police create conditions distasteful enough, it should be no surprise that
the suspect would make a stress-compliant confession to escape those conditions.
Alternately, oppressive circumstances could overbear the suspect’s will to the
point that he or she comes to doubt his or her own memory, believes the
relentless accusations made by the police, and gives an induced confession.99

A variety of factors may create an atmosphere of oppression, including
ignoring the individual’s basic needs, such as sustenance, clothing, sleep,
and medical attention; depriving the individual of access to counsel; and
subjecting the individual to excessively aggressive, intimidating, and
prolonged questioning.100 The Court therefore properly acknowledged

94. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 203–04.
95. White, supra note 25, at 144.
96. Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 948–49; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at
54; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 997–98; White, supra note 25,
at 143–45.
97. White, supra note 25, at 128, 130.
98. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 38–39.
99. Id. at 38.
100. Id. at 39. The court included police use of nonexistent evidence as a potential
ground of oppression. Id. However, it is more properly viewed as a problematic
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that the manner in which the police structure the interrogation environment
and conduct the questioning helps to create the stress and pressure that
researchers have linked to the making of false confessions.101 However,
it would have been better if the Court had independently listed both the
tone of questioning and the length of questioning when identifying the
types of factors that can contribute to oppression, because each has an
independent role to play in enhancing the risk of a false confession.
D. Application of the Rule
As the above discussion demonstrates, the degree of protection that
the modern confessions rule affords against the risk of false confessions
depends in large measure on a contextual application of the rule. This is
particularly necessary to ensure that personal vulnerabilities that fall
short of establishing cognitive incapacity under the operating mind
doctrine are not neglected in a court’s assessment of voluntariness. A
further caveat is, therefore, in order. The manner in which the Court
applied the reformulated confessions rule in Oickle raises the concern
that it ultimately fixated too narrowly on the individual tactics that the
police used and failed to properly assess the overall effect of those
techniques.102 If lower courts apply the same approach to the totality of
circumstances test, the protective force of the modern rule may be
significantly undermined.
A more detailed examination of Oickle illustrates the validity of this
concern. According to the Court, Oickle’s statements were voluntary
because the police conducted the interrogation in a proper manner:
Their questioning, while persistent and often accusatorial, was never hostile,
aggressive, or intimidating. They repeatedly offered the accused food and drink.
They allowed him to use the bathroom upon request. Before his first confession
and subsequent arrest, they repeatedly told him he could leave at any time. In
this context, the alleged inducements offered by the police do not raise a
reasonable doubt as to the confessions’ voluntariness. Nor do I find fault with
the role played by the polygraph test in this case. While the police admittedly
exaggerated the reliability of such devices, the tactic of inflating the reliability

interrogation technique, and I have therefore addressed it in that context. See supra
notes 48–55, 64–67 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and
Solutions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36, 42–43
(Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001).
102. Other commentators have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., DON
STUART, CHARTER JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 134–43 (4th ed. 2005).
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of incriminating evidence is a common, and generally unobjectionable one.
Whether standing alone, or in combination with the other mild inducements
used in this appeal, it does not render the confessions involuntary.103

However, a fuller consideration of the personal and situational risk
indicators that were present in Oickle casts doubt on this conclusion.
In particular, the police were dealing with a sleep-deprived individual.
The overall interrogation process was lengthy—played out over a period
of approximately ten hours without a significant break.104 The police
minimized the moral culpability of the offenses. They suggested that
Oickle would feel better if he confessed, and that admitting his problem
would earn him the respect of his fiancée and members of the community.105
They held out minor inducements to Oickle, suggesting that a confession
would make it easier to address his apparent pyromania, a fact
downplayed by the Court on the basis that there was no real quid pro quo
offer. They made a minor threat by indicating that in the absence of a
confession it might be necessary to polygraph Oickle’s fiancée,106 which
the Court minimized because it concluded that Oickle would have
understood that his fiancée would be interviewed as an alibi witness
rather than as a suspect.107 The police initially questioned Oickle in a
gentle, reassuring manner so as to gain his trust and then exploited that
trust in later questioning. They impliedly offered to treat the fires as a
“package deal,” which the Court downplayed on the basis that it was
Oickle who first suggested it.108 They exaggerated the reliability of the
polygraph test. Although the Court is correct that none of these elements
alone might justify exclusion based on the current state of false
confessions research, the existence of all of these factors in one case
ought to have raised more cause for concern about the reliability of the
confession.
E. Procedural Protections
False confessions researchers have universally concluded that a mandatory
videotaping requirement offers considerable protection against false

103. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 14.
104. The polygraph examination started at about 3 p.m., and the final interrogation
session ended at about 1:00 a.m. the next morning. After the conclusion of the
polygraph test, Oickle was interrogated with only short breaks for approximately six
hours. Three police officers were involved in the overall process. Id. at 15–18.
105. Id. at 48.
106. Id. at 49–50.
107. Id. at 50–51.
108. Id. at 46–47.
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confessions.109 A videotape record provides a complete, objective, and
reviewable account of the interrogation, thereby facilitating both the
investigative and fact-finding processes.110 This is particularly important
given the known limitations of memory, particularly for conversation.111
A videotape record allows investigators to focus fully on the suspect’s
verbal and nonverbal communications, which helps to ensure investigators
do not ignore relevant forensic information.112 The record preserves this
information so that both investigators and counsel can review the interview
and assess the quality and reliability of the information obtained from the
suspect, including determining who is the actual source of the information.
At trial, the videotape record minimizes the need to make credibility
assessments in order to resolve disputes between the individual and the
interviewing officers regarding what occurred in the interrogation room.
In addition, a videotape record will reveal the individual’s general
condition at the time of the interrogation and any specific vulnerabilities
that are present. It will also reveal any abuse or other improper police
109. See, e.g., WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 190–95;
Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for
Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and
Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L.R. 619 (2004); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra
note 7, at 60–61; Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 3, at 494–95; Ofshe & Leo,
Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1120–22; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 238;
White, Capital Cases, supra note 22, at 1025–30.
110. Videotaping is not superior to audiotaping in all respects. For example,
research indicates that people are better able to assess the truth or falsity of a confession
based on auditory cues alone. See Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner & Rebecca J.
Norwick, “I’d Know a False Confession if I Saw One”: A Comparative Study of College
Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 222 (2005). However,
as these researchers recognize, recommendations to videotape interrogations are intended
to achieve multiple goals including, but not limited to, improving the ability of the factfinder to assess the reliability of the confession. It may also be possible to minimize the
impact of misleading visual cues through appropriate camera placement. See G. Daniel
Lassiter & Andrew L. Geers, Bias and Accuracy in the Evaluation of Confession
Evidence, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 29, at 197,
210.
111. See generally Deborah Davis & Richard D. Friedman, Memory for Conversation:
The Orphan Child of Witness Memory Researchers, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR EVENTS 3, 12–41 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007) (analyzing
reasons why conversational memory is deficient).
112. For an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of videotaping from
the law enforcement perspective, see William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and
Confessions (1992), reprinted in THE MIRANDA DEBATE 303, 303–13 (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) and THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH
RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (special report by Northwestern U. Sch. of Law
Center on Wrongful Convictions, Chicago, IL), Summer 2004.
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conduct during the interrogation, thereby acting as a deterrent against
such misconduct. At the same time, it offers protection to interviewing
officers against false accusations of such tactics.113 There are also few
negative consequences to videotaping because the presence of the
videotape does not seem to diminish the willingness of individuals to
make confessions and may even increase the guilty pleas and conviction
rates.114 Nor is videotaping a particularly costly practice.115 For these and
other reasons, many law enforcement personnel favor the videotaping of
suspect interrogations.116 However, the usefulness of a videotape in assessing
voluntariness depends in part on the manner of taping. In particular, an equalfocus perspective, which includes both the interrogator and suspect,
should be used because viewers tend to underestimate the coerciveness
of the situation when only the suspect is visible on the tape.117 In
addition, the full interrogation, not just the final statement of the
individual, should be videotaped to help minimize the risk that the
confession is the result of improper off-camera interactions between the
police and the individual.118
The modern rule does not make the admissibility of a confession
dependent on its being videotaped. The Court in Oickle acknowledges

113. The videotapes of interrogations can also be used for training purposes to
improve the quality of police interviewing methods. See SULLIVAN, supra note 112, at
18.
114. See Geller, supra note 112, at 311–12; Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically
Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory Approaches to Police
Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 450 (2001). It may also decrease the length of
some interrogations.
115. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 61.
116. Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations:
Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128 (2005). But such support is
clearly not universal. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras
Roll: Mandatory Videotaping Is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions,
(2001) 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 412–19 (2001) (recounting how police and prosecutors
successfully opposed such an initiative in Illinois).
117. Lassiter & Geers, supra note 110, at 201–10. For a recent review of the
research on the effect of camera perspective on observer assessments of the degree of
coercion present during videotaped interrogations, see G. Daniel Lassiter et al.,
Videotaped Confessions: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 28 LAW & POL’Y 192 (2006).
The authors conclude that “the advantages associated with the videotape method—for
example, a more detailed record of the interrogation is provided to trial participants—can
be maintained without introducing bias if an equal-focus perspective is taken by the
video camera.” Id. at 204.
118. Admittedly, ensuring that there is a full video recording of the formal
interrogation process does not itself eliminate the possibility that the confession is the
result of off-camera interactions between the police and the individual. For a thoughtful
discussion of the problem and potential consequences of unrecorded questioning, see
David Dixon, “A Window in the Interviewing Process?” The Audio-Visual Recording of
Police Interrogation in New South Wales, Australia, 16 POLICING & SOC. 323, 335–342
(2006).
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the benefits of videotaping suspect interrogations, but then emphasizes
that this does not mean “that non-recorded interrogations are inherently
suspect.”119 This aspect of Oickle is unsatisfactory, particularly given
the Court’s recognition of the many benefits of videotaping. There
appears to be little reason today not to impose a mandatory videotaping
requirement.120 Ideally this should be part of a comprehensive regime
that regulates all aspects of the interrogation process.121 Unfortunately,
at present this seems unlikely to occur. Therefore, at the very least the
Court should hold that absent some valid explanation from the police, a
nonrecorded interrogation is inherently suspect if videotape recording
equipment was available to the officers and could have been used to
record the interrogation.122
III. CONCLUSION
There is undeniably a need for further research with respect to the role
that individual vulnerabilities and police interrogation tactics play in
false confessions. The Supreme Court’s reformulation of the Canadian
confessions rule in Oickle does conform quite closely to current knowledge
119. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 31. The court’s reluctance to mandate
videotaping of suspect interrogations is surprising given its enthusiastic embrace of
videotaping in earlier decisions. See R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740.
120. The Federal Provincial Territorial Working Group on Miscarriages of Justice
has recommended videotaping all custodial interrogations in cases involving allegations
of significant personal violence. See FED. PROVINCIAL TERRITORIAL HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS
COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE
73, 84 (2004), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hop/ PreventionOfMiscarriagesOf
Justice.pdf. However, there is no compelling reason to limit the initiative to these cases.
See Christopher Sherrin, Comment on the Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages of
Justice, 52 CRIM. L.Q. 140, 155–65 (2007).
121. See generally Dixon, supra note 118 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of videotaping).
122. The Ontario Court of Appeal initially adopted this approach, but subsequently
retreated from it by holding it is not absolute. Compare R. v. Moore-McFarlane, (2001)
160 C.C.C. (3d) 493, 517 (Ont. C.A.) (finding purposely unrecorded interrogation
inherently suspect), with R. v. Backhouse, (2005) 194 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 46–47 (Ont. C.A)
(finding record of interrogation adequate despite lack of police attempt to make a
recording). Other provincial appellate courts have refused to adopt similar approaches
on the basis that it conflicts with Oickle. See R. v. Crockett, (2002) 170 C.C.C. (3d) 569,
573–76 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Ducharme, (2004) 182 C.C.C. (3d) 243, 254–57 (Man. C.A.).
The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that where a confession is disputed, trial judges
must instruct the jury that the failure to make a proper recording of the statement is an
important factor to consider in deciding whether to accept the officer’s version of the
statement. See R. v. Wilson, (2006) 210 C.C.C. (3d) 23, 32 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Swanek,
(2005) 28 C.R. (6th) 93, 96–97 (Ont. C.A.).
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about false confessions. The rule affords considerable protection to
innocent individuals. However, it also has some significant shortcomings.
The rule provides provincial appeal and trial courts with only some of
the tools to recognize and exclude potentially unreliable confessions.
Moreover, if the rule is to operate properly, both counsel and judges
must be alert to the factors that indicate an enhanced risk of false
confession. In particular, counsel and judges must be cognizant of the
fact that interrogation strategies and tactics that are unobjectionable in
themselves, when used in combination or in relation to vulnerable
individuals, may lead innocent individuals to falsely confess.
Ultimately, while Oickle is an important response to the risk of false
confessions and wrongful convictions, it should not be the Court’s final
response. Further reforms are not only desirable but also necessary. In
particular, the Supreme Court should provide further guidance to trial
judges on the role of individual vulnerabilities in false confessions by
specifically identifying relevant vulnerabilities and indicating how those
vulnerabilities can impact the reliability of a confession. In addition, the
Court should mandate the videotaping of all interrogations. To ensure
the best possible protection, the interrogation should be recorded in its
entirety and the camera should include in its focus both the interviewer
and the suspect. Videotaping is admittedly not a perfect solution. As
Oickle demonstrates, even with a videotape there may be debate over the
exact nature of the strategies and techniques the police employed and the
impact they had on the accused individual.
The Court should also reconsider whether it is time to at least partially
abandon the totality of circumstances approach to assessing voluntariness
and, instead, begin the process of regulating more directly the conduct of
interrogations and the permissibility of certain interrogation techniques.
There are two key areas for potential reform: imposing limits on continuous
interrogations by mandating regular meal and sleep breaks, and prohibiting
the use of false forensic evidence to deceive an individual about the
strength of the case.123 Not all commentators agree that research investigating
the role that police interrogation techniques play in causing false confessions
is sufficiently advanced to warrant greater regulation of these techniques.124
However, in the face of verified evidence of false confessions leading to
wrongful convictions, a proactive approach in this area is clearly desirable,
123. See, e.g., WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 204, 212;
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 60; see also White, Capital Cases, supra note 22,
at 1007, 1015–25.
124. Sherrin, supra note 38, at 622–29. Sherrin therefore prefers to focus on individual
vulnerabilities. Sherrin, supra note 120, at 156–57. See also Laura Magid, Deceptive
Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1193
(2001).
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particularly because the research confirms that law enforcement obtains
many false confessions from individuals who do not possess psychological
vulnerabilities.125 The Court should also consider the desirability of adding
an additional component to the modern rule, namely a post-interrogation
reliability analysis that focuses on the vulnerabilities of the individual,
the probable truth of the confession, and any police improprieties in
obtaining the statement, including conduct that may have tainted the
statement.126 More particularly, the analysis should examine the extent
to which the individual was independently able to describe the crime and
crime scene, identify features of the crime or crime scene that were not
public knowledge, and supply information that generated new evidence
relating to the crime.127 Although false confessions cannot be entirely
prevented, implementing these reforms, or even some of them, would
help to reduce the overall number of false confessions, while simultaneously
improving the ability of courts to detect those that do occur.

125. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 918–20; Gudjonsson, supra note 47, at 492,
495, 499.
126. See generally Kent Roach, Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions:
The Case for Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced
Confessions, 52 CRIM. L.Q. 210, 228–35 (2007).
127. See Kassin, supra note 55, at 221; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 198–99,
239; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 992–94, 996–97, 1118–20;
White, Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2024–26; Welsh White, False Confessions in
Criminal Cases, 17 CRIM. JUST. 5, 5–7 (2003).

499

IVES.DOC

500

11/9/2007 10:59:38 AM

